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PLEADING-ANSwER----GENERAL DENIAL RENDERED
INEFFECTIVE By THE USE OF A SPECIFIC DENIAL
The plaintiff in a negligence action alleged she was operating her
automobile in a northerly direction along Miami Road in Hamilton
County, Ohio, approaching an intersection and that her rate of speed did
not exceed twenty-five miles per hour. The plaintiff also alleged that
the defendant, "through Chester Petrie, its agent and employee who
was then and there working within the scope of his employment, was
operating a Sohio Gasoline truck over and along Galbraith Road afore-
said in an easterly direction" and that while plaintiff was proceeding
through the intersection "the defendant suddenly and without warning,
without stopping before entering the intersection, aforesaid, drove said
truck with great force into the front of plaintiff's car striking same with
the right front side of defendant's truck causing injuries to the plaintiff."
In its amended answer, the defendant admitted its corporate ex-
istence, that Galbraith Road and Miami Road existed as described and
that on October 2, 1951, "a collision occurred between an automobile
driven by Lucia E. Hermanies and defendant's truck operated by Chester
Petrie at the intersection of Miami and Galbraith Roads." These ad-
missions were followed by the statement that "defendant denies each and
every other allegation of plaintiff's petition, not hereinbefore admitted to
be true, and specifically denies that the truck driven by Chester Petrie
entered said intersection suddenly and without stopping. Defendant
further specifically denies that plaintiff was injured to the extent and
suffered damages in the amount claimed in her petition."
At the trial, the defense counsel's rather lengthy and detailed
opening statement gave no indication that the defendant disputed the
allegation that defendant's truck was being operated at the time in the
course of the defendant's business by its agent or employee. As the trial
proceeded, the plaintiff rested her case without offering any evidence on
the averment that Petrie was acting for the defendant at that time. No
motion for directed verdict or judgment was made; nor was the atten-
tion of the court called in any other manner to the failure of the
plaintiff to offer evidence upon all the elements of her case.
Defendant proceeded with its defense and rested without placing
Petrie on the stand, notwithstanding the statement of defense counsel in
his opening statement that Petrie would testify. In its general charge,
the court did not submit the issue of Petrie's authority to the jury. The
court entered judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with the verdict
returned by the jury. The defendant's motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, based upon plaintiff's failure to prove the agency,
was overruled. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, affirmed. Held,
both special and general denials in the same answer are improper; a gen-
RECENT DECISIONS
eral denial is no broader than and puts in issue no more than the ac-
companying specific denial. Hermanies v. Standard Oil Co., 102 Ohio
App. 143, 131 N.E. 2d 233 (1955).
A general denial usually serves to put all the allegations of a
complaint in issue.1 A common form of the general denial includes a
denial of "each and every allegation" of the plaintiff's petition.2 A fre-
quently used modification is the practice of combining a general denial
with one or more specific admissions.' Although this practice has been
criticized as a mongrel form of answer,4 illegitimate,5 and conducive to
uncertainty, confusion, and inconsistency,6 it is now frequently used and
its validity seems to be clearly established.' The problem in the principal
case was not the use of specific admissions with a general denial, but the
use of specific denials with a general denial.
If the defendant in the instant case had limited itself to a general
denial with specific admissions the court might have reversed on the
grounds that the defendant's general denial placed the employee's au-
thority in issue, that the plaintiff had the burden of proving the existence
of such authority, and that she failed to satisfy this burden. However,
when, as in the instant case, a general denial is limited by specific denials,
the allegation of agency, not having been specifically denied, is impliedly
admitted.
In contradistinction to a general denial, the purpose of a specific
denial is to put in issue only certain specific allegations of a petition,
thereby narrowing the issues and concentrating the evidence on the
material facts actually in dispute.8 A common form of a specific denial
establishes the facts following the words "defendant specifically denies
that.... ." Frequently, in those jurisdictions where numbered paragraphs
are proper, it is sufficient to merely state that the defendant denies the
allegations contained in a designated numbered paragraph of the
complaint.'
1 Bakas v. Casparis Stone Co., 14 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 577, 585 (1913).
2 Creighton v. Kellermann, 12 Ohio Dec. Rep. 788 (1857); CLARK ON CODE
PLEADING, 584 (2d ed. 1947).
3This modification is exemplified in the pleadings of the principal case,
wherein defendant admitted its corporate existence, the discription of certain roads,
the occurrence of a collision, and then denied "each and every other allegation of
plaintiff's petition, not hereinbefore admitted to be true."
4 POMEROY ON CODE REMEDIES §524 (5th ed. 1929).
.5 Converse v. Panhard Motors Co., 21 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 345 (1918). The
strict interpretation taken by Judge Kinkead, Common Pleas Court of Franklin
County, in this case, appears to be the only Ohio case holding specific admissions
improper.
G Bakas v. Casparis Stone Co., supra note 1 (dictum).
7Ibid.; Aleshire v. Pittsburgh C.C. & L. R. Co., 25 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 215
(1923).
8 Ridenour v. Mayo, 29 Ohio St. 138 (1876); Powers v. Armstrong, 36
Ohio St. 357 (1881).
9 CLARK ON CODE PLEADING, 587 (2d Ed. 1947).
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The proper content of an answer is governed by §2309.13 of the Ohio
Revised Code, which provides in part:
The answer shall contain:
(A) A general or specific denial of each material allegation
of the petition controverted by the defendant ...
This language has created interpretation problems, largely centered
around the meaning of the conjunction "or,"'" but also extending to the
definition of the word "specific."
11
The importance of these interpretations becomes paramount when
it is realized that many defendants have adopted the practice of combining
general and specific denials, as well as specific admissions, in their an-
swers. This practice is exemplified by the principal case. The explanation
of this practice can most likely be traced to a pleader's desire to emphasize
his denial of certain basic allegations of the plaintiff's petition before the
court and jury.
Thus, in the principal case the defendant apparently felt the need
to emphasize his denial of Petrie's negligence, and Lucia Hermanies' in-
juries. It may also have felt that a special denial of Petrie's agency
might have been detrimental because of the probability that plaintiff
could prove it, and thereby weaken the defense in the eyes of the jury.
However, the alternative of a general denial alone might have weakened
the desired emphasis upon the defenses of no negligence and incon-
sequential injuries. Faced with this dilemma, the defendant, in the hope
that he could "eat his cake and keep it too," erroneously adopted the
unauthorized practice of incorporating both the special and general denial
into its answer.
The Ohio reported decisions, without any known exception, appear
to have held this type of pleading to be improper, and in violation of the
provisions of §2309.13 of the Ohio Revised Code. There is almost
complete agreement that these provisions should be interpreted to mean
that a denial must be either general or specific, but cannot be both.'
Accordingly, it would seem that the decision of the principal case
is in complete agreement with early Ohio cases, and serves to reaffirm a
fundamental rule of Ohio pleading that has remained unmentioned in
the Ohio reported decisions for over thirty years. It is a good rule, and
its strict enforcement by the courts should result in more concise de-
fensive pleading. Although this rule has probably been frequently vio-
lated in the past, and may continue to be violated in the future, the
principal case should serve as a reminder of the grave danger which
attends violation of this rule of pleading.
Lawrence H. Stotter
10 See Wood v. Connecticut Fire Insurance Co., 17 N.P. (n.s.) 273 (1913 1.
11 See editorial by John G. White, 17 Ohio L. Rep. (n.s.) 17 (1919).
12 Creighton v. Kellerman, supra note 2; Wood v. Connecticut Fire Insurance
Co., supra note 12. But see editorials by John G. White, 17 Ohio L. Rep. (n.s.) 17
(1919), 22 Ohio L. Rep. (n.s.) 711 (1925).
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